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We develop a model of statistical discrimination in occupational licensing. In the model, there is 
endogenous occupation selection and wage determination that depends on how costly it is to 
obtain the license and the productivity of the human capital that is bundled with the license. 
Under these assumptions, we find a unique equilibrium with sharp comparative statics for the 
licensing premiums. The key theoretical result in this paper is that the licensing premium is 
higher for workers who are members of demographic groups that face a higher cost of licensing. 
The intuition for this result is that the higher cost of licensing makes the license a more 
informative labor market signal. (This is a similar insight to Spence 1973). The predictions of the 
model can explain, for example, the empirical finding in the literature that occupational licenses 
that preclude felons close the racial wage gap among men by conferring a higher premium to 
black men than to white men (Blair and Chung 2018). Moreover, we show that in general the 
optimal cost of licensing is nonzero: an infinitely costly licenses screens out all workers, while a 
costless license is no screen at all. 
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1 Discrimination & Licensing
Statistical discrimination against female and minority workers occurs when employers
believe that workers of these types are less qualified, on average, or have a productivity
that is drawn from a noisier distribution than their male or white peers, respectively (Ar-
row, 1973). For example, if employers believe that women have lower (higher) expected
productivity than that of white men, in equilibrium, women will receive lower (higher)
wages than white men if individual productivity is not directly observable.2 Likewise,
holding expected productivity constant across groups, if employers believe that the pro-
ductivity distribution of women is noisier (sharper) than that of white men, in equilib-
rium, women will receive lower (higher) wages than white men. An important theoreti-
cal finding in the literature is that employer priors about worker productivity by worker
type can themselves endogenously generate wage gaps through a self-fulfilling prophecy
mechanism, even if the priors are incorrect at the outset (Coate and Loury, 1993).
In the spirit of Coate and Loury (1993) and Moro and Norman (2004), we develop
a model of occupational licensing in which there is endogenous occupation selection
and endogenous wage determination. Our model differs from these two self-fulfilling
prophecy models in that we assume that the distribution of worker ability is heteroge-
neous by worker type, fully known to employers, and correctly perceived by employers
ex ante. The assumptions that we make allow for a unique equilibrium wage for licensed
and unlicensed workers for each race and gender group.
Our model admits a unique equilibrium, in contrast to discrimination models with a
self-fulfilling prophecy feature, which admit multiple equilibria.3 We are expressly inter-
ested in the comparative statics of the model that reflect whether occupational licensing
2The initial wages will be lower, but over time, as the firm learns about worker productivity from on-
the-job performance, these wage gaps should diminish, as in Altonji and Pierret (2001).
3The existence of multiple equilibria is a feature of self-fulfilling prophecy models. This demonstrates
how inequality in labor market outcomes can arise between two ex ante identical groups of workers. By
comparison, our goal in this paper is to take firm beliefs about workers’ abilities as given and determine
the extent to which workers sort into licensed occupations in order to signal their type.
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results in heterogeneous wage premium for licensed workers by race or gender. It is ei-
ther because firms have different priors over the underlying distributions of ability, or
because workers face different average costs of investing in the licensing signal.
Our work also contributes to the theoretical literature on occupational licensing by
providing an analytically tractable model of licensing as a job market signal, in the spirit
of Spence (1973). The standard model of occupational licensing is Leland (1979), which
studied licensing from an optimal legislation vantage point. Whereas Leland (1979) fo-
cused on whether it is socially optimal to have quality standards, Persico (2015) studied
the incentives of incumbent workers to impose occupational requirements on new en-
trants. We build a micro-founded model in which the licensing decisions of workers and
the wages offered by firms are endogenous outcomes of a two-period sequential screen-
ing game played by firms and workers.
2 Model
Our model is a two-sector, two-period model of firms and workers, consisting of a unit
measure of risk-neutral workers and an occupational licensing requirement for workers
in sector 1 but not sector 2. In each sector, there is a single representative firm. Firms do
not observe a worker’s ability, but firms do observe whether or not a worker has a license.
Because licensing is costly and more easily accessible for workers of higher ability, an
occupational license acts as a signal of ability in an analogous way to education in Spence
(1973).
In period 1, firms set wages to maximize profits, namely ωL for the licensed sector
and ωU for the unlicensed sector. In period 2, workers choose the sector that delivers
the highest utility, given the wages offered by firms and given the relative preferences of
workers over employment in the two sectors. The equilibrium of the model is a vector of
wages (ω∗L, ω
∗
U) and a fraction of licensed workers f
∗ that satisfies the utility maximiza-
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tion motive of workers and the profit-maximizing motive of firms. Because firms, which
are the uninformed party in our model, move first, our model falls under the technical
definition of a screening model (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1990).
2.1 Description of Workers’ Tastes and Abilities
Each worker, indexed by the subscript i, is endowed with an ability ai and a relative taste
for the unlicensed sector εi. For licenses that preclude ex-offenders, ability maps to crimi-
nal history in the model. For licenses that require passing a test, ability maps to cognitive
ability. In cases where the license has no test or criminal requirement, ability measures
the ability/willingness to pay the hassle cost of completing the licensing paperwork.
The ability type and the relative sector preference are independently and identically
distributed across workers and drawn from the following two uniform distributions: ai ∼
U[µa − σa, µa + σa] and εi ∼ U[µε − σε, µε + σε]. We assume uniform distributions for the
sake of analytical tractability. The sector taste parameters, µε and σε, are measured in units
of dollars so that they enter the worker’s utility function on the same footing as wages.
The ability and preference distribution are allowed to be different for workers of different
racial and gender groups. For notational simplicity, however, we suppress the group
index and solve the model separately for each group. The sign of the comparative statics
will describe how differences in firms’ priors between women and men, minorities and
nonminorities, map onto differences in the licensing wage premium across demographic
groups.
Obtaining an occupational license is costly for workers of all abilities. To obtain an
occupational license, a worker of ability ai incurs a cost:
c(ai) = c0 − θ(ai − µa). (1)
The parameter c0 > 0 is the unconditional average cost of obtaining an occupational
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license for workers of a given group.4 For example, the average cost of obtaining a license
in an occupation with a felony restriction will be higher on average for workers from
groups that face higher incarceration rates. The parameter θ is the marginal benefit of
ability. Each unit increase in ability lowers the cost of licensing by an amount θ. For
ability measures that make it easier for a worker to obtain an occupational license (e.g.,
IQ), we will assume a positive marginal benefit of ability (i.e., θ > 0). For ability measures
such as a worker’s level of criminality or criminal history, which, by law, make obtaining
an occupational license more difficult, we assume a negative marginal benefit of ability
(i.e., θ < 0).
In the unlicensed sector, a worker i receives utility VU,i, which is the sum of the wages
earned in the unlicensed sector, ωU, and the relative taste that she has for the unlicensed
sector, εi:
VU,i = ωU + εi. (2)
In the licensed sector, a worker i receives utility VL,i, which is the difference between the
wages earned in the licensed sector, ωL, and the cost, c(ai), that she incurred in order to
obtain the license:
VL,i = ωL − [c0 − θ(ai − µa)]. (3)
2.2 Firms
Each firm, j, possesses a technology that converts one unit of worker ability into ω̄ dollars’
worth of goods. In the licensed sector, j = 1, the occupational license is also bundled with
an exogenous level of useful human capital (training) 0 ≤ h ≤ 1, which augments the
worker’s ability to utilize the technology by a factor of (1 + h).5 The expected profit for
4It is also the cost of licensing for the worker of average ability, ai = µa.
5The cost of acquiring this human capital is borne by the workers, as in Equation (1).
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the representative firm in the licensed occupation is given by
E[π1] =
Avg. Output per Worker︷ ︸︸ ︷
ω̄(1 + h)E[ai|Li = 1]
Measure of Workers︷ ︸︸ ︷
E[P(Li = 1|ai)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Revenue




where E[ai|Li = 1] is the expected ability of a worker conditional on employment in the
licensed sector and E[P(Li = 1|ai)] is the fraction of workers in the licensed sector. The
expected profit for the representative firm in the unlicensed occupation is given by
E[π2] = ω̄E[ai|Li = 0]E[P(Li = 0|ai)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected Revenue




where E[ai|Li = 0] is the expected ability of a worker conditional on employment in
the unlicensed sector and E[P(Li = 0|ai)] is the fraction of workers employed in the
unlicensed sector.
Proposition 1. If the average cost of licensing c0 ∈ (c, c̄), where c ≡ hω̄µa − µε − 3σε and c̄ ≡
hω̄µa − µε + 3σε, a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists with a wage for unlicensed
workers:
ω∗U = ω̄µa −
1
3
(c0 − c), (6)
a wage for licensed workers:
ω∗L = ω̄µa −
1
3








(c0 + µε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wage Benefit of Licensing
, (7)
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and the fraction of workers with an occupational license is an interior point given by







If c0 ≥ c̄, it is not worthwhile to have a license even for the highest-ability workers.
Hence, all workers pool on not having a license, i.e., f ∗ = 0. If the cost of licensing is
sufficiently low, i.e., c0 ≤ c, licensing is cost-effective even for the lowest ability type, and
all workers pool on having a license, i.e., f ∗ = 1. In between these two extremes, we have
an interior solution in which a fraction, 0 < f ∗ < 1, of the workers select into the licensed
sector.
Proposition 2. The licensing premium, α, is unambiguously increasing in the average cost of the
license, i.e. dαdc0 > 0.










1 + 13 h
)













The higher the cost of licensing, the costlier it is for lower-ability workers to obtain
the license, and hence the stronger the signaling value of the occupational license. In an
earlier paper of ours, we regard felony restrictions on a license as imposing a cost that
differentially affects black men—the group facing a higher incarceration rate (Blair and
Chung, 2018). Our current model provides a theoretical basis for the main finding in that
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paper: that a higher licensing premium for black men (relative to white men) only exists
in the licensed occupations with a permanent felony restriction. This model also builds on
the empirical findings of Law and Marks (2009), which demonstrated that licensing laws
during the Progressive Era increased racial diversity in the teaching and practical nursing
professions and increased gender diversity in the fields of engineering and pharmacy.
Proposition 3. The licensing premium increases the level of human capital bundled with the
license (h), if the licensing premium is less than 100%. The licensing premium unambiguously
decreases the average ability of workers (µa).
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, the more human capital that is bundled with the license, the higher the
marginal product of labor, and hence the higher the equilibrium wage. Moreover, the li-
cense is more informative when the expected ability of the worker, given other observables—
e.g., race and gender—is lower. Hence, the higher licensing premium.
In Blair and Chung (2018), we also show that the licensing premium for women (both
black and white) is greater than the licensing premium for white men. This result is
consistent with groups with lower perceived ability earning higher licensing premiums.
Proposition 4. Define the industry surplus as the sum of firm profits and worker wages net of




(c̄ + hω̄µa) . (12)
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is similar to that in Spence (1973)—a license is informative
because it is costly. In a market with workers of heterogeneous abilities, the optimal cost-
of-licensing burden is neither zero nor infinity.
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One important caveat here is that the industry surplus differs from the typical social
surplus in that it abstracts from the welfare loss experienced by customers from higher
prices, as in Kleiner and Soltas (2019). In this respect, this welfare calculation is closer in
spirit to the producer surplus in Persico (2015), where the goal is to determine whether
firms and incumbent workers, acting collusively, benefit from licensing, given that work-
ers will endure the cost of licensing.
3 Conclusion
Economists traditionally viewed occupational licensing as a labor market friction (Fried-
man, 1962). The arguments in this paper suggest that licensing is also an informative
labor market signal, because it is costly to obtain. Consistent with this model, in Blair and
Chung (2018), we show that occupational licensing closes the racial wage gap between
men when the license credibly signals a worker’s criminal history. Given the intractable
nature of the racial wage gap, as documented in Bayer and Charles (2018), it is remark-
able that occupational licensing can close the racial wage gap. For a reform of occupa-
tional licensing to be successful, a key implication of our work is that policymakers need
to acknowledge the signaling value of a license and its differentially positive impact on




ALTONJI, J. G. AND C. R. PIERRET (2001): “Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimi-
nation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 313–50.
ARROW, K. (1973): “The Theory of Discrimination,” in Discrimination in Labor Markets, ed.
by O. Ashenfelter and A. Rees, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
BAYER, P. AND K. K. CHARLES (2018): “Divergent Paths: A New Perspective on Earnings
Differences between Black and White Men since 1940,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
133, 1459–1501.
BLAIR, P. Q. AND B. CHUNG (2018): “Job Market Signaling through Occupational Licens-
ing,” NBER Working Paper No. 24791.
COATE, S. AND G. C. LOURY (1993): “Will Affirmative Action Policies Eliminate Negative
Stereotypes?” American Economic Review, 83, 1220–40.
FRIEDMAN, M. (1962): Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
HAN, S. AND M. M. KLEINER (2016): “Analyzing the Influence of Occupational Licensing
Duration on Labor Market Outcomes,” NBER Working Paper No. 22810.
KLEINER, M. M. AND E. J. SOLTAS (2019): “A Welfare Analysis of Occupational Licensing
in U.S. States,” NBER Working Paper No. 26383.
LAW, M. AND M. MARKS (2009): “Effects of Occupational Licensing Laws on Minorities:
Evidence from the Progressive Era,” Journal of Law and Economics, 52, 351–366.
LELAND, H. (1979): “Quacks, Lemons and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality
Standards,” Journal of Political Economy, 87, 1328–46.
MORO, A. AND P. NORMAN (2004): “General Equilibrium Model of Statistical Discrimi-
nation,” Journal of Economic Theory, 114, 1–30.
PERSICO, N. (2015): “The Political Economy of Occupational Licensing Associations,”
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 31, 213–241.
SAKALA, L. (2014): “Breaking Down Mass Incarceration in the 2010 Census: State-by-
State Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity,” Tech. rep., University of Zurich, Depart-
ment of Informatics.
SPENCE, M. (1973): “Job Market Signaling,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 355–74.
STIGLITZ, J. AND A. WEISS (1990): “Sorting Out the Differences between Signaling and
Screening Models,” Working Paper 93, National Bureau of Economic Research.
10
A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
To solve this sequential game, we use the solution concept of subgame perfect equilib-
rium (SPE). In an SPE, we solve the model using backwards induction. First, workers
in Period 2 sort into the sector that produces the highest net return, given wages and
their preferences. Next, in Period 1, the representative firm in each sector chooses the
corresponding wage to maximize firm profits, given the sorting of workers.
A.1.1 Period #2: Workers Choose Sector
Starting in Period 2, the probability that a worker of ability ai sorts into the licensed sector,
P(L = 1|ai), is given by the probability that the net benefit of working in the licensed
sector is greater than the net benefit of working in the unlicensed sector:









where ∆ω ≡ (ωL − c0) − (ωU + µε) is the expected net benefit of licensing across
workers of all types. The conditional probability of licensing is increasing in the expected
net benefit of licensing. It is also increasing in worker ability for cases where worker
ability lowers the cost of licensing θ > 0, but decreasing in worker ability in cases where
worker ability increases the cost of licensing θ < 0.
A.1.2 Period #1: Firms Choose Wages
Next, we must compute firm profits given the sorting decisions of workers. In order to
compute profits for the representative firms in both the licensed and unlicensed sectors,
we first compute the fraction of workers who sort into the licensed profession and the
unlicensed profession, i.e., E[P(Li = 1|ai)] and E[P(Li = 0|ai)], because these quantities
enter into the expected labor cost of the firms:
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Given that we have a two-sector model, a worker is employed either in the licensed or
in the unlicensed sector. Consequently,







To compute firm profits, we must also compute the expected ability level of a worker
given that she has a license E(ai|Li = 1) and given that she does not have a license
E(ai|Li = 0), both of which contribute to firm revenue:


































































































Firm 1 chooses ωL to maximize its profits, π1. This results in the following first-order































=⇒ ωL = −σε − ∆ω + (1 + h)ω̄µa
(20)
To get the best response function of the firm in the licensed sector, we rearrange the
expression above and substitute in the definition for the net benefit of licensing, ∆ω =




[(1 + h)ω̄µa + ωU + c0 + (µε − σε)] (21)
The best response function for the wages in the licensed sector is increasing in the level
of human capital that is bundled with the license h and with the quality of the firm’s
technology ω̄. It is also increasing in the wage offered by the unlicensed firm, the cost of
licensing, and the minimum taste for the unlicensed sector, µε − σε.
To find the best response function for Firm 2, we assert that Firm 2 chooses ωU to
maximize its profits, π2. When we take the first-order condition
∂π2
∂ωU
= 0, we get
ωU = −σε + ∆ω + ω̄µa (22)
To get the best response function of Firm 2, we rearrange the expression above and




[ω̄µa + (ωL − c0)− (µε + σε)] (23)
The best response function for the wages in the unlicensed sector is increasing with the
quality of the firm’s technology ω̄, the average ability of all workers, and the competing
wages in the licensed sector. It is decreasing in the cost of obtaining a license and the
maximum taste for the unlicensed sector by workers, µε + σε. At the Nash equilibrium,
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both firms’ wages are mutual best responses. Substituting the best response of the firm
in the licensed sector into the best response function for the firm in the unlicensed sector,



























To solve for the equilibrium wages in the licensed sector, we insert equilibrium wages




































To solve for the fraction of licensed workers, we substitute equilibrium wages into the





ω̄µah− c0 − µε
6σε
. (26)
Defining c ≡ hω̄µa − µε − 3σε, it is straightforward to show that if the average cost of
licensing, c0, is lower than c, licensing is sufficiently cheap. Then, all workers obtain a
license and work in the licensed sector ( f = 1). Likewise, defining c̄ ≡ hω̄µa− µε + 3σε, if
the average cost of licensing, c0, is higher than c̄, licensing is sufficiently onerous. Hence,
all workers prefer not to obtain a license ( f = 0). It is only for intermediate value c0 ∈
(c, c̄) that we observe a nonzero fraction of workers in both the licensed and unlicensed
sectors.
We further simplify the expression for the fraction of licensed workers in Equation







ω∗U = ω̄µa −
1
3










(c0 + µε) . (29)
Corollary 1. Wages are unambiguously higher in the licensed sector than in the unlicensed sec-
tor, and the cost of licensing is increasing the wedge between these two wages. In equilibrium,
unlicensed workers also experience a wage benefit from the human capital that is bundled with the
licensing. This wage benefit is half the human capital benefit experienced by licensed workers.
The fact that licensing is bundled with human capital h increases the market return
to licensed labor and, in doing so, increases the value of the outside option of workers
who opt not to become licensed. Consistent with this prediction of the model, Han and
Kleiner (2016) provide evidence that workers in a licensed occupation who do not pos-
sess a license but can practice because of grandfathering provisions experience a 5 percent
increase in wages as a result of their occupation becoming licensed, when compared to
similar unlicensed workers in occupations with no licensing requirements. By contrast,
the wage premium to licensed workers in the occupation, when compared to similar un-
licensed workers in occupations with no licensing requirements, is 12 percentage points
higher than the wage premium experienced by grandfathered workers.
Corollary 2. Given two distinct groups of workers, B and W, in which the average cost of licens-
ing is greater for group B than for group W (i.e., co,B > c0,W), unlicensed B workers earn less
than unlicensed W workers. By contrast, licensed B workers earn more than licensed W workers,
ceteris paribus. This follows from the fact that wages are decreasing in c0 for unlicensed workers
(Equation 6) but increasing in c0 for licensed workers (Equation 7).
The result of this corollary offers testable predictions. First, unlicensed black men
earn less, on average, than unlicensed white men. Second, licensed black men working in
occupations with felony restrictions earn, on average, slightly more than licensed white
men in similar occupations. The presumption here is that the felony restriction imposes a
higher average cost of licensing on black men relative to white men. Using data from the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sakala (2014) documents that black men are six times more
likely to be incarcerated than white men, which is consistent with this assumption.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3









1 + 13 h
)
ω̄µa − 13(c0 + µε)− σε
. (30)
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The license premium increases in c0 because the wage gap (numerator) increases in c0
and the wage in the unlicensed sector (denominator) decreases in c0. In particular, the











The derivative of the licensing premium with respect to the mean ability is
dα
dµa













Therefore, dαdh > 0 =⇒ 2ω
∗
U −ω∗L > 0, which holds when
ω∗L−ω∗U
ω∗U
< 1 (i.e., α < 1).
The positive relationship between the licensing premium and the dispersion in sector
taste comes from the fact that wages in the unlicensed sector (denominator) fall with
σε.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The total social surplus is the sum of the firm’s revenue minus the expected cost of licens-
ing. Since the expected wages of employees are a cost to firms and a benefit to workers,
they net out in the social surplus calculation in the case where we place an equal weight-
ing on firm profits and net worker wages:
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To find the optimal social cost of licensing, we take the derivative of the social surplus






















(σε + ∆ω) +
1
6σε
c0 = 0
=⇒ c∗0 =
1
2
(c̄ + hω̄µa)
(36)
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